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1. Hyper-Modernizing China’s Urban Syndrome
Juxtaposing a socialist state-commanded yet market-driven (somewhat
successful) economic development, socialist China’s mega-urbanization project
makes millions of people escaped from absolute poverty (of less than 1 US$ per
day) and urban dwellers are becoming richer but having more housing problems
since economic liberalization in early 1980s. Over 9% of annual GDP growth since
1980s in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is a multiple economic miracle:
historical both in Chinese and global history; the hyper-modernization processes
result in over 50% of its population are now (2012) residing in cities?mostly by
migrant-workers drawn from rural areas (Bowring 2013; NBSC, 2011). Yet, there
are enigmatic consequences of socialist China’s hyper-modernization, this paper
examines structural conditions (and contradictions) of low income housing
development in (post-)socialist China’s rapid urbanization, as the socialist state’s
(inertia) neoliberal economic initiatives to foster development.
??????????????????????????????????????????
* Professor, School of Policy Studies, Kwansei Gakuin University.
**Acknowledgement:
This paper is derived from an ongoing project on Sustainable Society in Comparative Perspectives,
with generous supports from Kwansei Gakuin University’s Special Research Leave Fund (2013−
14), Individual Research Fund and School of Policy Studies Research Fund, Honorary
Professorship, Dept. Social Work & Social Administration at The University of Hong Kong, and
Visiting Professorship at United Nations University?Institute of Advanced Studies. An extended
version of this will be appeared on in B.Aldrich & R. Sandhu (2014). Urban Slums in
Comparative Perspective. New Delhi: Sage. Many colleagues provide views and supports during
this study. The normal disclaimer applies. Comments are welcome: oklai@kwansei.ac.jp
Kwansei Gakuin University
Social Sciences Review
Vol. 18, 2013
Nishinomiya, Japan
?
1.1 Economic Miracle-driven Urban Contradictions in Socialist State’s
Developmentalism
China’s economic growth with over 9% for several decades since its Open
Door Policy in late 1970s, received much attentions and coined as miracle by
neoliberal economic agencies like IMF and the World Bank as the world model for
liberal economic development. More recently, it is the world’s second-largest
economy: despite its recent slowing economic growth, down from 9.2% (in 2011)
and 10.4% (in 2010), China’s economy still expanded impressively by 8.2% in
2012, vis-à-vis the developed (like OECD) countries.
In (post-)socialist China, the mode of (semi-)planned urbanization is the
consequence, as well as the representation, of political struggles over socialist
ideologies on pro-capitalist development: urbanization and segregations are
intertwined with the state’s urban governance in pre-1970s era, but more or less as
structurally anchoring on the emerging market forces in the last thirty years: the
influence of the Chinese Communist Part (CCP) ideologies on national (pro-growth
economic) developmentalism (to secure the legitimacy of itself) and the political
struggles within the CCP, and perhaps more importantly, the national economic
problems encountered and the pragmatic policy responses in different periods along
the path for semi-integration with global capitalist economy (Lai 1998, 2001, 2007).
The CCP’s pragmatism and expediency are evolving with their strategies as the
timely modus operandi.
Rapid urbanization mirrors the liberalization of the economy since 1978. The
relaxation, and the subsequent demise, of the household registration (hukou) system
was a direct result of rationalization of labour force in rural areas’ modernization
which produced increasing number of redundant peasants?the push factor of rural-
to-urban migration; coupled with the incapability of the rural economy to provide
incentive for people to staying in the rural areas.
The surge of housing demand from those rural-to-urban migrants became a
major problem for urban municipalities and local governments which had almost no
funding to cope with this sort of newly developed and differentiated demand, as
most of the housing stocks were within the control of production sectors: work-units
(danwei). Under these constraints, paralleling to the commodification (commodity
housing: shangpinfang; commercialization) of public housing by work-units
(danwei), it is not surprising that, having no housing stock, urban municipalities had
difficulty assuming a significant role in the housing reform through the initiatives
for alternative (commodity) housing. Furthermore, the urban crisis was also
exacerbated by the underdevelopment of infrastructure in urban areas, or the
bottleneck problem. This was coupled with the inertia against the SOEs reform and
the monopolistic power of local authorities in (under) pricing the land and property
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market. Since 2004, the hukou system though is only serving the personal
information registration purpose and no more controlling on people mobility; but the
hukou system excludes the incoming migrants from access to public services. And
most SOEs no longer consider affording housing provision are their basic service to
their employers?all have to go for market to get residence (Lai 1998, 2001, 2007).
Affordable housing is a key concern not just for local citizens already living in
cities, but also the migrants, as well as all international investors who have to secure
residence for their workers (Lai 2007; Li and Duda 2010). The combined effects of
rural-to-urban migration driven by relative poverty, breakdown of hukou system,
and the ever-increasing population pressure with under-provision of affordable
housing are the sources of social conflicts, segregation and social exclusions of
various forms?all these are part of the formation of the permanence of those (over
250 million migrant, floating, population having) nomadic sub-classes of (urban)
citizenship. Hence, urban problems become the China’s Syndrome of rapid
urbanization: dualism of various forms can be witnessed in any part of China today.
Perhaps the most contrasting, if not the worst, urban phenomena are the
juxtaposition of super-modern high-rise architecture with pre-modern manual
(cheap) labour for service industries of domestic waste collection, and those 21st
century high-tech, foreign imported, luxury cars running side-by-side with the pre-
modern, century-old, man-powered carts, in Chinese world class cities like
Shanghai. The CCP recently had to acknowledge this dualism with policy to address
the problems?trying to demonstrate the benevolence of an affective state (Yang
2013).
2. The Property Market-driven Multiple Deprivations in China
Slum settlements are disappearing from new urban architecture in China but
they are remaking in different forms; mostly in the sub-markets, are less
concentrated or en masse in a particular location, more likely be in transient and
nocturnal temporary (Mahadevia, et al.,2012). Those living in “slum-equivalent”
spaces are not just those “laid-off workers, underpaid and underprivileged migrant
labourers from the countryside,” due to economic reform (Solinger 2006: 177), but
also those working as middle-lower, lower and poor sub-classes. Migrants and long
term residents alike are suffering from different forms of deprivations in China’s
internationalizing cities. These sub-classes have to bear with the rocket-high living
cost in the market place; or the guanxi (functional social relationship based)
“rationing” of public housing, education and health services by the CCP cadres, who
can determine who gets what with the subtle rule for the so-called “guanxi-
privileged access to” limited urban services.
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2.1 The Everlasting Nomadic Rural-to-Urban Great Migration
The influx of over millions of migrant workers from pre-modern village living
to super-modern cities’ temporary housing in China, since its late 1970s economic
liberalization policy, has been characterized by four major dynamics. First and
foremost, it is nomadic yet seasonal: not just because of most migrant workers’
returning home for a few weeks during Lunar Chinese New Year (the Spring
Festival. More problematically most migrant workers do not have, and will not
likely have, any formal urban resident status (no household hukou registration).
Second, the scale of a few hundred millions?the 2011 official data from the Sixth
National Population 2010 Census indicated over 261 millions?is unprecedented in
Chinese and human history (NBSC 2011). Third, there is a trend that the
momentum for rural-to-urban migration due to the continual economic reform
(migrant-workers at large) has been on the rise: There has been an 81% increase for
the population mobility with different household registration from the last place of
their residence (rural) place for new working (urban) site from the year 2000 to
2010. Last but not least, the share of urban dwellers (following the official
household hukou registration) has crossed the bench mark of 50% in 2010. Rapid
urbanization has been taking place in the past 30 years and will continue for the
future as well.
With an ever expanding urban yet internationalizing economy, to cope with
both domestic demand and external business for exports and exchanges, laborers
have been drawn from the less developed rural localities en masse. The most
obvious case is by one of the major subcontractors for information and
communication technologies gadgets (i-Phone, i-Pad, i-Pod, Kindle, PlayStation,
etc.), the Taiwanese electronic manufacturing group?Foxconn (http://www.foxconn.
com/). It has employed, and provides factory-residence for, more than one million
rural-to-urban migrant workers in several different major coastal Chinese cities.
Contrasting the export-led rapid industrialization which calls for rural-to-urban
labour mobility en masse are perhaps the most significant yet invisible migrants
moving into the rapidly urbanizing localities to take up the dirty, dangerous and
demand jobs (which no longer attract city dwellers) in both formal and informal
economies (Loyalka 2012). Due to low status and poorly paid job conditions, the
nomadic lower, sub-and-under-classes are subject to various forms of discrimination
and segregation in the modernizing cities of the internationalizing market forces, and
to local government neglect. Living in temporary housing or even homeless is
common for these members of the under-classes. The mega traffic, back-and-forth
flows, during the one-month long “Spring Movement” before and after the Lunar
Chinese New Year, when over 250 million migrant workers return to their home
villages demonstrates the deep contradictions in working, but not living, in cities.
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The experience of the rural to urban migration in China context is obvious:
those migrant workers not acquiring functional social networks with local residents
at hosting locality (lineage and kinship based social relationship) were more prone
to suffer from problems of adjustment, adaption and integration. They risk being
trapped in permanent poverty and falling into the nomadic under-sub-classes in
urban areas (Hsu 2012; Yang 2013; Yue, et al. 2013). There is neither much actual
calling from the CCP nor any local government for actual policy initiatives for the
acceptance or socio-economic integration of nomadic migrant workers in cities.
Therefore they remain nomadic!
The household registration system of hukou in particular has the strongest
discrimination effect upon migrants’ working life chance in Chinese transitional
economy (Gravemeyer, et al., 2010; Whyte, Ed. 2010). Furthermore, local
government policies, officialdom and their control on an individual’s socio-
economic rights in the emerging segregated markets have been shaped not just the
labour processes, but also contribute to the emergence and subsequent formation of
urban dualism. This dualism between rich and poor, local residents and migrants,
formal and informal economic activities −− along the geo-social contours of the
household registration system (hukou)?is embedded in a highly differentiated,
segregated labour market −cum− public service rationing.
Urban housing conditions in (post-) socialist China have idiosyncrasies; the
most obvious ones are the institutional discrimination against migrant workers in
super-modern cities, and the party cadres’ power over human rights. The nomadic
under-subclasses in China are very different from their counterparts in other
developing economies like Brazil, India and Mexico. There migrants have been
settling in whatever form of temporary housing in-site they can find, while they
launch a long term battle for their urban survival. This has contributed to a
differentiated class struggle in the urban arena, constituting the new metropolis
(Pieters and Schoukens 2012). But the CCP cadres’ urban managerial control on
household registration (hukou) rations public services, segregating and excluding the
migrants; thereby making them as permanent nomadic social subclasses without
socio-economic integration in cities.
2.2 Perpetual Urban Dualism in China’s Continual Economic Revolution
(Post-)Socialist China’s economic reform is urban biased: the continual reform
contributes to the formation of the middle class and this nascent bourgeoisie class
opts for individualistic lifestyles of their own; more even so for those being bought
up as the only-child in the family (under One-Child Policy implemented at the same
period with economic liberalization in the late 1970s) who yearn for foreign brand
luxuries and palace-like private property-home, if affordable). This is a dramatic
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moving away from utopian Maoist socialism. More specifically home ownership,
mostly through mortgaging one’s house, becomes China’s new middle class dream.
But the urban dream is underlain by the risk of becoming one those in the under-
classes; disenfranchised and underprivileged in urban core (Bowring 2013; Kung, et
al 2013).
China is one of the fastest-growing urban agglomerations in the world; at the
top of hyper-modernization and rapid economic reform-after-reform. But housing
question is still problematic in the (post-)socialist city. The typical neighbourhood
suffered from multiple deprivations and several households had to co-live in
partitioned tenements:
the average dwelling area per capita is 9.8 m2, which is much lower than the
average standard for Guangzhou (18.19 m2) and almost half the standard of
workers’ villages (17.6 m2). Most public housing in this neighborhood cannot
be sold to sitting tenants because of poor indoor facilities and the complexity
of ownership (e.g., some are properties without owners and some are private
property but under public trust), and only 27.8% of interviewees own their
housing. While the rent for public housing has been relatively stable, private
rentals have increased by 2.74 times in the past 10 years, resulting in increases
in living expenditure (Yuan, et al. 2011, p.730).
Furthermore, many urban dwellers have experienced deprivations in urban
services, and/or actual poverty since late 1980s. China’s pro-market continual
reform has been creating new urban poverty of various forms: not only the
increasing number of those low income people who cannot catch up with the rise of
housing and commodity prices, but the dis-enfranchised and underprivileged groups
created by property-development’s forced evictions and the ever-increasing rural-to-
urban migrant enclaves. It juxtaposes the continuing destruction of neighbourhood
and social fabrics under urban redevelopment strategies for new property
development and nation building projects, e.g., Beijing Olympics 2008 and
Shanghai Expo 2010. What is distinctive about the Chinese urban transformation
process is the discriminatory-cum-discretionary role it plays in shaping and creating
multiple deprivations, new and old, and poverty of all variations. And multiple
deprivations are not necessarily associated just with low income ((Lin, et al., 2011;
Wu et al., 2012; Yuan, et al., 2011).
As a result, social inequalities in housing and urban deprivations have been
causing conflict between the haves and have-nots, poor and rich, and more
problematically, tearing down the social fabrics in communities, and extending the
urban dwellers’ cynicism, if not open criticism, of the CCP. Nobody knows whether
China’s aggregated urban contradictions will turn into another revolution in the
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quest for basic housing rights, but deprivations-driven social unrest is on the rise,
challenging the governability of the CCP and its local state machineries.
2.3 From Urban Dream to Nightmare: Free-Falling of the Middle Class?
The so-called “new urban dream of China” has been formed with the twining
of property market development and middle class’ homeownership through the
maximization of one’s economic value in the market place with the new production
of private housing and the consumption of new residential spaces (Abramson 2011;
Zhang 2010). The urban processes shape not just the new identities of various social
actors according to their social (housing) class, but also their access to economic
means through a functional social network to the CCP’s cadres, e.g., guanxi, the
functional social reciprocity in socialist China. More specifically, the emergence of
new social agencies for rapid urbanization, like real estate developers, property
agents, homeowners −cum− investors, juxtaposing those who are excluded from new
urban spaces, is historically new for (post-)socialist China. Despite their differential
and heterogeneous compositions, all of them have the heighted sense of insecurity
(no trust on collective commons or society as a whole), partly due to the rise and
fall, gain and lost, in the property market cycles, and the problematic governance of
the CCP over its economic and political project for state developmentalism; or
alternatively, the party-cadre-leaders’ self-interest at different level of the state
machinery (Abramson 2011; Su and Tao 2012).
Perhaps the best kept twin-secret for the dark side of urban economic in China
is epitomized by the permanence of the so-called “mortgage slaves” (fang nu) for
young (age 25 to 35) professionals who secure a better job but have to contribute a
significant amount (30−40%) of their income to housing mortgage as long as their
working years; and problematically, the ever-increasing numbers of the so-called
“ant tribes” (yi zu) or recent university graduates who are entering a severely
competitive labour market without much hope for securing a permanent job (The
Economist, 28. Jan., 2012). Accordingly, as many as three million young
professionals, born in or after the mid-1980s, most recently graduated from
universities, stay in slum-like conditions, e.g., underground redundant infrastructure
like the sewage system or the bunkers built during Cold War era no longer use, in
overcrowded temporary housing at the peripheries, and commuting in-and-out, of
big cities like Beijing (Al Jazeera 2012).
While the increasing number of “mortgage slaves” is a norm for, reflecting the
booming, property market, the prolonged period (say 20−30 years of mortgage for
young professionals) it is not uncommon given the rocket-high property price and
the stagnation of urban wage (vis-à-vis living costs and property prices). But those
paying long and high mortgage-payments have to forfeit their family wish-list. And
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as disposable income is minimally for survival, they are not happy to be property-
bound and their own and family’s quality of life suffers in return.
In strong contrast, those well-educated “ant tribe” members suffer not just the
bad living conditions with a downward-spiralling of their wages, social status and
competitiveness, but also the urban dreams for better life and future through hard
work and learning, and loyalty to the state’s continual reform agenda for national
development with economic liberalization) is lost. For the last decade alone, there
were over 20 million Chinese graduates yearly attempting to enter the highly
competitive labour market and most of them were disappointed. Surveys show
young white-collar workers in cities were not happy and have no sense of security
for the future:
After two decades of economic reform, per capita GDP has risen 13-fold, and
average salaries in major cities are on par with those in many developed
countries. The post-80s generation. . . . many find themselves squeezed by
skyrocketing housing costs, rising prices for basic necessities and family
pressures (Al Jazeera, 2012).
Obviously, and as happened recently, the post-1980s generation, highly
differentiated in the opportunities structure of being the “ant tribe” or the “mortgage
slaves”, has commonly voiced their complaints and angers through various
demonstrations, using various pretexts, say, the Sino-Japanese territorial conflicts
over Daioyu / Senkaku Islands, or urban conflicts and problems arising from the
officials’ abuse of power. This is the most worrying problem for the CCP
leadership: given the permanence of the “ant tribe” and “mortgage slaves”, coupled
with many other disenfranchised groups −− these urban tribal groups become not
just the source of, the incubator for, discontents and anti-government appeals, but
they have the 21st century knowledge of using new media and organization
strategies to challenge the CCP-party legitimacy for socialist China’s state
developmentalism!
3. Socialist China’s Urban Future beyond Hyper-Modernization
The exponential growth of the urban economy has been drawing migrant-
workers out from villages and towns into the urban sector?One of the historical
phenomena of China’s hyper-modernization project with rapid urbanization is the
nomadic population flow. The influx of migrant workers in rapidly urbanizing
localities shapes the formation of new nomadic under-classes. Because they have no
household registration, hukou , or are merely temporary residents, they have no
entitlements for public services such as housing, medical care or education. For
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many local governments, these migrants and temporary residents have not been
considered for any urban policy development. In short, they are left to live their
own life; left out of any public service development. This highly differentiated, if
not divided or dualistic, policy reference conditions the formation of slum or
underprivileged temporary settlements and contradictions in urban China (Abramson
2011; Chen et al. 2011; Lai 2009; Lin et al. 2011; Tang et al. 2011; Wu et al.
2012).
3.1 Permanence of Urban Dualism in the State Developmentalism?
Moving beyond the consensus on neoliberalism about Chinese economic
miracle, it should be stressed that there is an almost complete monopoly of property
development by the state apparatus in China, particularly the local state’s control
over the land use (change) for rapid urbanization. Local governments (and their
party cadres) can pocket the “windfall profits” thanks to the CCP absolute power to
offer any (low) compensation terms in the name of nation interests. Urban processes
in many (townships to be) cities has been captured by the pro-growth alliance of the
CCP leaders and their cadres and increasingly powerful businessmen (Su and Tao
2012; Kung et al. 2013; Yang, Ed., 2012).
Hence, the active land conversion for (commercial and real estate developments
in premium locations) higher land price, coupled with the speculative market forces,
reinforces the state-induced urbanization process (Chen et al. 2011; Kung et al.
2013; Xu 2011). The continual economic reform has completely changed the urban
landscape; super-modern high-rise architecture and luxurious housing are built onto
the logistic networks and hubs of highways, international airports and high-sped
trains. Seemingly urbanity offers a better yet expensive quality of life. But clearly,
all these have stringent monetary and social class-specific prerequisites. Urban
dualism thus is an integral part of 21st Century urban China.
One of the main problems of the Chinese differential dualism of hyper-
development, which can be seen benefiting the new rich but creating the under-
classes, is that it is structurally embedded in Chinese (authoritarian?) communist
champion for state developmentalism. Both central and local governments are pro-
economic growth, neglecting the equitable (equalization of life chances for) public
services.
And the dualism between rural and urban sectors, as well as the dualistic life
chance in cities, must be addressed for China’s future. For instance, despite the
minimal poverty alleviation impact by inter-governmental fiscal subsidies directing
to specific target group like farmers, a recent detailed analysis argues that “to reduce
income disparities more effectively in the rural sector, China requires more
centralized management of program design to ensure that subsidy programs are
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aimed at the poor and low income groups” (Lin & Wong 2012: 45). There needs to
be continual reform goals for equitable fiscal provisions both horizontally and
vertically in the Chinese administrative system.
Obviously, this call should not be just for administrative reform, but a more
fundamental change of the CCP’s modus operandi for development at large. This
also applies to any mitigating measures to address the syndrome of hyper-
modernization, social dualism, with various forms of inequalities in both urban and
rural sectors. At the least there should be actions to prevent the party cadres’ and
officials’ from “ripping-off” the development benefits.
3.2 Socialist Nostalgic Rediscovery: Economic Reform for Whose Interest?
China’s pro-urbanization (land asset and housing property) developmentalism is
structured and aligned by the shifting of fiscal power from the central to local states,
coupled with a new reciprocity exchange favouring the localities (Kung et al. 2013;
Lin 2007). This is demonstrated by the CCP’s daunting task of using both fiscal and
monetary policy instruments as counter-cyclical measures for the stimulation of real
estate market development while attempting to stabilize the property (and retailing)
prices (Kung et al. 2013; Su and Tao 2012; Xu and Yeh 2009, Yang Ed. 2012). The
structural linkages between central and local governments, as well as the pro-growth
ideologies for a better future, are echoing each other in the powerful elitist circles;
but there is not much resonance at both urban and rural grassroots levels.
Under neoliberal economic hegemony for continual urban reform, the
transformation has many repercussions for every aspect of people’s life and their
survival. The last two-decade of accumulated frustration over the broken reform
promises is in strong contrast to the beginning phase of economic reform in the
mid-1980s. For veteran urban dwellers, the urban experience in the early reform era
was distinguishably new, from bad to good, if not euphoric, for a better future under
new ideology of liberalizing economic development for everyone. Then, the bad
experience of the past, class struggles under the “continual” Cultural Revolution,
etc., was somewhat forgettable (and forgivable). What Ho and Ng term as “public
amnesia of the socialist past.”, metaphorically referring to an empirical phenomenon
that occurred only decades ago seem no longer to be questioned by most people in
the present (2008, p.390; cf. Gravemeyer, et al. 2010).
But the new social insecurity is obvious: the number of employees in China’s
informal sectors (not covered by any social security) has increased, vis-à-vis the
formal employment. The ratio between the informal and formal sectors are from 1:4
to 1:2, for the period 1996 to 2001 (Pieters and Schoukens 2012: 156; Cheng 2010).
More are employed with no job or social securities! Due to the new urban economy,
many citizens are left out of the social security arrangements entirely; not to
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mention the impossibility of upward socio-economic mobility for many urban
dwellers. Hence the dualism between the formal and informal economies is also
reality for new urban China. Arising from these frustrations and disappointments is
a strong resonance from the disenfranchised groups for the nostalgic ideals about
fairness and equality under Chinese Communism in those old, poor days; as shown
in the mobilization for “Singing Red Songs”?the red songs praise are the Maoist
revolutionary ideals of the goodness, justice and fairness of Chinese communism
under CCP leadership. But these social virtues have been burnt in the fire of
continual pro-market reform. As the “Red-Song” episode is one of the many
legacies of communism in China, they will be haunting the CCP as long as socio-
economic (mega-urbanization) dualism continues.
The uniqueness of China’s ascendency, the three-decade long economic miracle
with over 9% GDP growth annually, and its geopolitical success in the global
capitalist system, has created both internal conflicts (contradictory to the CCP goals
for “fair and just” socio-economic development.)and external tensions. These
reinforce socio-economic contradictions like urban unrests, coupled with the
exacerbating political un-governability of the CCP’s project for communist-state
capitalism (CMP 2013; Hung, Ed. 2009; Huang 2011; So 2010; Yang Ed. 2012;
Yang 2013). China embraced not just neoliberal economic strategies up since 1980s
but more state developmentalism in 2000s onwards (for perpetual economic
supremacy to serve the CCP’s legitimacy to govern 1.3 billion population), while
only benefiting those self-chosen or appointed communist agencies and power elites.
The CCP claims for providing basic services, housing and health care alike, for free,
are merely propaganda, as experienced by urban dwellers?permanence of the
exploited under-classes and underprivileged in urban dualism. For these alone, there
will be challenges for China’s urban future.
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